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I. INTRODUCTION
We are currently in the fourth era in the history of American civil
procedure.I In this era, plaintiffs in federal court confront a rigorous pleading
standard.2 Defendants benefit from a summary judgment standard that grew
teeth.3 Adjudication is routinely outsourced to private providers. Trials have
I Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas 0. Main, The Fourth Era ofAmerican Civil Procedure,
162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014). See also Tidmarsh, infra note 7; see also infra notes 8 and
63.
2 See generally Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A
Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); Scott Dodson, New
Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2010); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley
to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE
L.J. 1 (2010); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C.L. REv. 431 (2008);
Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010).
See generally Brooke D. Coleman, Summary Judgment: What We Think We Know
Versus What We Ought to Know, 43 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 705 (2012); Arthur R. Miller, The
Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion, " "Liability Crises, " and
Efficiency Clichis Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 982, 1047 (2003); Melissa Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary
Judgment After Celotex, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 53 (1988); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted
Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict,
and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1988); Suja Thomas, Why Summary
Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007); John Bronsteen, Against
Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522 (2007).
4 See generally David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83
GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995); Judith Resnik, A2J/A2K: Access to Justice, Access to Knowledge,
and Economic Inequalities in Open Courts and Arbitrations, 96 N.C.L. REV. 605 (2018);
Judith Resnik, Diffiusing Disputes: The Public in the Private ofArbitration, the Private in
Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015); Matthew A. Shapiro,
Delegating Procedure, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (2018); Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits
and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 241
(1996); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Procedure: ADR and the Justices' "Second Wave"
Constriction of Court Access and Claim Development, 70 SMU L. REV. 765 (2017).
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nearly vanished.' And settlement is the new polestar.6 None of these
characteristics of the fourth era has improved access to justice for plaintiffs.
All of these reforms are fairly reviled for their anti-litigation, anti-law-
enforcement, and pro-business effects.8
Although the ideological explanations for these reforms have
purchase, this article explores a non- (or at least a far less) ideological
explanation. Moving beyond the familiar ideological explanations is important
because such accounts do not fully explain the reforms that brought us into the
fourth era. Indeed, the fingerprints of judges appointed by Republicans and
Democrats are on all of these reforms.9 Moreover, by bringing into relief the
See generally Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Where Have You Gone, Spot Mozingo? A
Trial Judge's Lament over the Demise of the Civil Jury Trial, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 99
(2010); Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a
Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 399 (2011); Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119 (2002); Marc Galanter,
The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State
Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004); Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the
Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing
Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 705 (2004); William G.
Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 67 (2006).
6 See generally E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of
Procedure, 53 U. CI. L. REV. 306 (1986); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE
L.J. 1073 (1984); Richard D. Freer, Exodus from and Transformation of American Civil
Litigation, 65 EMORY L.J. 1491 (2016); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle ":
Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994); Arthur
R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix?, 69 MINN. L.REV. 1 (1984); Judith
Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Roles: Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking on
Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV. 133 (1997); Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
See Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases "On the Merits", 87 DENV. U.L. REV. 407, 418
n.47 (2010) (observing that there has been "no major reform to the Federal Rule over the
past forty years in which the idea of deciding cases 'on the merits' was the principal
motivation behind the reform").
8 See generally Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. REV.
501 (2012); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials
on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U.L. REV.
286, 304, 357 (2013) ("The consequences of the procedural movements of the last twenty-
five years are seismic ... . [T]here is no secret about what is happening, or frankly why,
and whom it all benefits."); A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil
Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 359 (2010) (observing that the animating value
in contemporary reforms is an "interest in excluding or discouraging claims rather than
supporting and encouraging them"); Subrin & Main, supra note 1.
9 See Subrin & Main, supra note 1. Although ideology can often help explain judicial
outcomes at the appellate level, empirical studies support the conclusion that there are little
or no political effects at the trial court level. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and
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non-ideological forces that triggered these reforms, we thereby expand the set
of solutions to reverse those reforms. Because if the fourth era reforms were
purely ideological, then the only realistic solution is to appoint judges with a
pro-plaintiff and anti-business orientation; and that strategy is impractical if
not also unseemly.
I offer an alternative history of the cause of the fourth era. Specifically,
I argue that the mediation movement of the late 1970s deserves blame for the
fourth era. To be sure, mediation is an unlikely villain. Mediation's pursuit of
voluntary agreements is self-evidently productive and noble. Rooted in
traditions of party self-determination, collaborative participation, and creative
problem-solving, mediation itself is hardly villainous. 10 Yet the popularity of
mediation may have precipitated the fourth era of civil procedure and all its
attendant woes.
The linchpin of my argument is that federal courts abandoned their
commitment to trials around 1985.11 The timing is important because it allows
me to trace the cause of that development to the modem alternative dispute
the Judiciary: The Influence ofJudicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
257, 281 (1995) (finding that the judges' political preferences do not affect the outcome of
summary judgment motions in civil rights cases); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study
of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 840-
41 (2010) (finding no effect of the judges' political party on class action settlements and
their fee awards); Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal
Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United
States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 193 (2010) (finding that the "[political] party of
the deciding judge bears no relation to outcome"). For political effects on rulemaking,
legislation, and appellate case law, see STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS
AND RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017).
Even at the appellate level, ideology can be confounding-especially in the field of
procedure. For example, the alignment of justices in the summary judgment trilogy cases
defies simple ideological characterization. Chief Justice Burger joined Justice Brennan's
dissenting opinion in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 329 (1986). In Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 268 (1986), a case that made summary judgments more
likely, Chief Justice Burger authored a dissent joined by Justice Rehnquist. In the pleading
context, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for a unanimous court in Leatherman
v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993)
(affirming the notice pleading standard). In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506
(2002), Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for a unanimous court.
io See generally ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION (1994); JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LITIGATION (1984); Nancy A. Welsh, The
Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable
Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1 (2001); KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH,
MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 2004).
" See infra notes 108-26 and accompanying text.
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resolution (ADR) movement, which began in 1976.12 The modem ADR
movement-and mediation in particular-promoted the idea that disputes
could be resolved through intervention by trained professionals. If mediators
could resolve cases without trials, why notjudges? A new regime of judicial
case management authorized judges to intervene in a manner akin to
mediators. Moreover, courts adopted mediation's message that trials were
slow, expensive, and invasive; in this mindset, trying a case was a failure of
judicial case management. 13
When courts abandoned their commitment to trials, judges needed
other tools to dispose of cases. After all, judges could get out of the business
of trying cases, but they could not get out of the business of disposing of
cases. 14 Some cases could be sent to ADR-by strictly enforcing arbitration
clauses or by requiring parties to mediate, for example.15 Some cases could
also be resolved by insourcing ADR, with judicial settlement conferences, for
example. 16 But not all cases could be sent to arbitration, resolved in mediation,
or settled in a judicial settlement conference. So how would judges dispose of
cases where the parties would not settle if the case could not be tried?
To appreciate the judges' dilemma, it is important to appreciate that
the modem ADR movement emerged while civil procedure was still in its third
era.17 In the third era, judges tried cases; in fact, it is not much of an
exaggeration to say that judges only tried cases.18 In 1976, cases were rarely
dismissed for failure to state a claim. 19 Summary judgments were
extraordinary.20 Trial was a realistic option, and parties either went to trial or
they settled in the shadow of a trial date.21
The vast majority of cases settled. In that sense, the fundamental
model of formal adjudication was highly passive-aggressive. In the thirdera,
for example, courts tried a fraction of cases (approximately ten percent), and22
the parties settled the remainder in the shadow of those dispositions.
Accordingly, when courts abandoned their commitment to trials, they lost the
"aggressive" component of the passive-aggressive couplet. 23 Passive-passive
12 See infra notes 27-57 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
14 See inf a notes 127-55 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 58-96 adacmayn et
1 See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
i9 See infra notes 79-81 adacmayn et
20 See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
22 i f  notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
13 See i fr  t  3-5 n  ccompanying t xt.
Seeinfa ote 8284and acco panyi  text.
21 ee fa nte 89 6and accompanying text.
2See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
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dispute resolution is not a workable model because judges need some way to
dispose of cases-or at least to threaten the disposition of cases.
Two key reforms-heightened pleading and a new summary
judgment standard-restored that essential "aggressive" component. These
fourth era reforms, which were predominantly a product of case law (as
opposed to rules amendments), created necessary leverage for trial judges to
credibly threaten dispositions that, in turn, allowed them to manage their cases
for settlement. 2 4
The argument, then, is that the modem ADR movement (and
mediation in particular), rather than some (other) ideology, beget the pleading
and summary judgment standards that exemplify contemporary practice and
procedure in the fourth era. The other key reforms of the fourth era-the
vanishing trial, the embrace of ADR, judicial case management and the pursuit
of settlement by any means necessary-are more obviously tied to the modem
ADR movement.25 Blame for all of the key fourth era reforms is thus traceable
to the modern ADR movement. This, in turn, matters because it is generally
accepted that the modern ADR movement had origins in both the political
"left" and "right." 26
Part II describes the birth of the modern alternative dispute resolution
movement in 1976. Part III locates the emergence of the modern ADR
movement within the third era of civil procedure. Part IV establishes how thejudicial establishment enthusiastically embraced ADR, including its anti-trial
narrative. Part V explains how the fourth era reforms were an ineluctable
systemic response to the abandonment of trials. Finally, the Conclusion
addresses three criticisms of the thesis that I anticipate.
II. THE MODERN ADR MOVEMENT BEGAN IN 1976
Histories of the modern ADR movement usually begin with the
famous Pound Conference of 1976.27 This periodization itself is interesting
historiography. The principal modes of ADR-arbitration and mediation28
had existed for centuries.29 The year 1976 was pivotal because, ironically,
formal adjudication shed new light on alternative dispute resolution.
24 See infra notes 145-55 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 43 and accompanying text.
27 See THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (A. Leo
Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds. 1979). See also infra note 99.
28 Other modes include small claims courts, community justice centers, negotiation,
conciliation, med-arb, grievance committees, rent-a-judge, and consumer complaint
panels.
29 See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW (1983); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
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At the Pound Conference, Chief Justice Warren Burger convened
leaders of the bench, the bar, and the academy to find "new machinery for
resolving disputes."3 0 One of the presenters, Professor Frank Sander, surveyed
a "diverse panoply of [alternative] dispute resolution processes." 3 1 These
processes already existed, but each served discrete constituencies and had
narrow ambition. Sander contemplated whether broader deployment and
reliance on these alternative modes could be useful and beneficial.32 The birth
of the modem ADR movement is the enduring legacy of the Pound
Conference. 33 The Google Books Ngram Viewer, which depicts how
frequently a term appeared in a corpus of five million books, likewise suggests
that something important about "alternative dispute resolution" happened in
the mid- to late-i 970s (and also suggests that ADR continued to generate ever
more attention over the next 20 years). 34
Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fail Accompli,
Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, II OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 297, 309-10
(1996). See generally Henry T. King, Jr. & Marc A. LeForestier, Arbitration in Ancient
Greece, 49 Disp. RESOL. J. 38 (1994); Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization ofInformalLaw:
Arbitration Before the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U.L. REV. 443 (1984). See also Henry
T. King, Jr. & Marc A. LeForestier, Papal Arbitration: How the Early Roman Catholic
Church Influenced Modern Dispute Resolution, 52 DISP. RESOL. J. 74, 78-79 (1997).
30 WARREN E. BURGER, Agenda for 2000 A.D. - A Need for Systematic Anticipation,
in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 25 (A. Leo Ievin
& Russell R. Wheeler eds. 1979).
31 FRANK E.A. SANDER, Varieties ofDispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 83 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds.
1979).
32 Id at 80-87.
33 See generally KOVACH, supra note 10, at 31-34; CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE
MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 19-24 (2d ed.
1996); Jay Folberg, A Mediation Overview: History and Dimensions of Practice, 1
MEDIATION Q. 3 (1983); Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass HalfFull, a Glass HalfEmpty: The
Use ofAlternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1587, 1592 (1995); Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 427 n.17 (1986); Laura Nader, The
ADR Explosion - The Implications of Rhetoric in Legal Reform, 8 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS
TO JUST. 269 (1988); Developments in the Law: The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 1752, 1851, 1853 n.9 (2000); Frank E.A. Sander, Developing the MRI (Mediation
Receptivity Index), 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 599, 599 (2007); Stempel, supra note
29, at 309, 312 n.42; Jean R. Sternlight, ADR is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where
It Fits in a System ofJustice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289, 289 n.3 (2002).
34 See GOOGLE BOOKS, http://books.google.com/ngrams (last visited Nov. 5, 2018).
See generally Jean-Baptiste Michel et al., Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions
ofDigitized Books, 331 SCIENCE 176 (2010).
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One consequence of the Pound Conference was the creation of a
Follow-Up Task Force "to assure proper consideration of the proposals made
at the conference, to provide the impetus for experimentation and, where
appropriate, implementation."3 5 Indicative of the infatuation with ADR, the
Task Force issued a lengthy report just four months later.36 The report's first
item, titled "New Mechanisms for the Delivery of Justice," lauded the
untapped potential of both arbitration and mediation.3 7
The popularity of ADR exploded. As Professor Jeffrey Stempel
described:
In the wake of the Pound Conference, ADR
continued to advance: (1) as part of the legal
profession's lexicon; (2) as a source of
continued experimentation-both by private
entities and the courts; (3) as a growing
industry; (4) as a source of authority for
altering litigation procedure, sometimes
streamlining it (managerial judging) and
sometimes enlarging it (through the
proliferation of local rules and detailed
standing orders that create a de facto second
set of local rules); (5) as a wellspring for legal
35 A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler, Epilogue, in THE POUND CONFERENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 289, 290-91 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R.
Wheeler eds. 1979).
36 American Bar Association, Report ofPound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, in
THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 295 (A. Leo Levin &
Russell R. Wheeler eds. 1979).
7 Id. at 301, 306-13.
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doctrine more solicitous of the application of
ADR; and (6) as a reference point for
criticizing courts, lawyers, and
adversarialism. 3 8
It is noteworthy that the modem ADR movement emerged "[i]n the wake of
the Pound Conference," as opposed to emerging in the wake of, say, the work
of the neighborhood justice centers funded by the Ford Foundation in 1968,39
or because of the Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution, which was
founded in the late 1960s. 4 0 Professors Soia Mentschikoff, Lon Fuller, and
others were carefully studying and distinguishing modes of dispute resolution
in the 1950s and 1960s. 4 1 The National Mediation Board had been successfully
mediating labor disputes in the railroad industry since 1934.42
Yet the broad-based movement was triggered by the Pound
Conference, when courts and professional elites embraced ADR. Prominent
judges, the American Bar Association, corporate counsel, the media,
academics, consumer advocates, the left, the right, and research and
philanthropic institutes viewed ADR as a solution.43 A few months after the
3 Stempel, supra note 29, at 317 (citations omitted).
39 See generally Catherine Cronin-Harris, Symposium on Business Dispute Resolution:
ADR and Beyond: Mainstreaming: Systemizing Corporate Use ofADR, 59 ALB. L. REV.
847, 850 (1996); Joseph B. Stulberg & Sharon Press, Variations on a Theme By Sander:
Does a Mediator Have a Philosophical Map?, 31 OHIO ST. J.ON DIsP. RESOL. 101 (2016).
40 See Gary L. Gill-Austern, Faithful, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 343, 359 n.70 (2000)
(quoting Albie M. Davis, Community Mediation in Massachusetts 19 (Jan. 1986), Salem,
Mass. Administrative Office of the District Court (explaining the 1975 origins of
Dorchester's Urban Court Program that, in turn, was based on the Institute for Mediation
and Conflict Resolution of New York City which joined the dispute resolution skills of
labor mediators to address community-based conflicts)).
41 See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, An Afterword: Science and the Judicial Process, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 1604 (1966); Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis.
L. REV. 3 (1963); Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV.
305 (1971); Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1961);
Soia Mentschikoff, The Significance ofArbitration-A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 698 (1952). See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and
Fathers ofInvention: The Intellectual Founders ofADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1
(2000).
42 See generally Robert A. Baruch Bush, Dispute Resolution-The Domestic Arena:
A Survey of Methods, Applications and Critical Issues, in BEYOND CONFRONTATION:
LEARNING CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 9 (John A. Vasquez et al.,
eds., 1995); KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION IN A NUTSHELL 16-34 (2003).
43 See J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON & P. SzANTON, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA:
PROCESSES IN EVOLUTION 69-74 (1984); Laura Nader, The Globalization ofLaw: ADR as
"Soft" Technology, 93 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 304, 309 (1999) ("The idea of ADR
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Follow-Up Task Force issued its report, its chair, Griffin Bell, became the
Attorney General of the United States; this put a strong advocate for ADR in
the executive branch.4 Chief Justice Burger led the judiciary, and Congress
immediately joined the effort. 4 6
Many of these ADR proponents believed that informal dispute
resolution would be more efficient than adjudication. 7 Other proponents
attracted strange bedfellows that ranged in political position from right to left."); Thomas
0. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 329, 336 nn.25-26 (2005) (collecting
authorities); Stephen N. Subrin, On Thinking About a Description of a Country's Civil
Procedure, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 139, 143-44 (1999); Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE
L.J. 905 (1979); Jim Miranker, Silicon Valley Courts Alternatives to Lawsuits, S.F.
EXAMINER, Dec. 1, 1985, at D-1, col. 1. For examples of conservative threads of this
history, see Warren Burger, Our Vicious Legal Spiral, 16 JUDGES J. at 23 (Fall 1977);
Warren Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A.J. 274 (1982); Brett Cattani, From
Courthouses of Many Doors to Third Party Intervention, CHRIS. SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 17,
1979, at 12, 13. For examples of progressive threads of this history, see Ralph Nader,
Consumerism and Legal Services: The Merging of Movements, 11 L. & Soc'y Rev. 247,
255 (1976); FORD FOUNDATION, CURRENT INTERESTS OF THE FORD FOUNDATION (1978).
Of course many have long expressed concerns about ADR, including at the Pound
Conference. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Priority ofHuman Rights in Court
Reform, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 87, (A. Leo
Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979); Laura Nader, Commentary, in THE POUND
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 114, 115-19 (A. Leo Levin &
Russell R. Wheeler eds. 1979). See also THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (Richard L.
Abel ed., 1982); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema,
99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986); Fiss, supra note 6; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:
Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991).
See generally Griffin Bell, The Pound Conference Follow-Up: A Response from the
Department of Justice, 76 F.R.D. 320 (1978). See also William Erickson, The Pound
Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First
Century, 76 F.R.D. 277 (1978).
4s See Burger, supra note 43, at 276-77. See also Dina R. Janerson, Representing Your
Clients Successfully in Mediation: Guidelines for Litigators, N.Y. LITIGATOR, Nov. 1995,
at 15 (quoting Chief Justice Burger at the 1985 Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on
Advocacy: Dispute Resolution Devices in a Democratic Society (Roscoe Pound-American
Trial Lawyers Foundation 1985)) ("The notion that ordinary people want black-robedjudges and well-dressed lawyers and fine courtrooms as settings to resolve their disputes
is not correct. People with problems, like people with pains, want relief, and they want it
as quickly and inexpensively as possible."), as quoted in Scott H. Blackmand & Rebecca
M. McNeill, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Commercial Intellectual Property Disputes,
47 AM. U. L. REV. 1709, 1711 n.4 (1998). See generally Edward Brunet, Questioning the
Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 2 & n.9 (1987); Stempel,
supra note 29, at 312-17.
' See Stempel, supra note 29, at 318 (discussing 1977 legislation).
47 The efficiency argument itself had multiple strains. For some, ADR offered an
escape from the formality of court processes; rigidity can create inefficiency. Others saw
efficiency gains based on predictability, by substituting expert decisionmakers for lay
546
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believed that informal dispute resolution mechanisms would improve access
to justice. 8 And others saw ADR's potential for more creative and enduring
solutions to disputes than formal adjudication's binary outcomes. 49 That these
different interest groups were trying to solve different problems was less
important than that they were allied in their quest for more ADR.
It makes sense that a broad-based ADR movement found traction only
after Chief Justice Burger and the courts generally offered their imprimatur.
States have a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive force.50 In the context
of dispute resolution, governments alone have authority to vindicate rights and
to assign responsibilities. Without the infrastructure provided by courts,
participation in ADR would be optional, ADR neutrals would have no
meaningful authority, and the outcomes of many ADR proceedings would be
non-binding and unenforceable.
Although welcomed by the courts as a partner in the enterprise of
dispute resolution, ADR providers had to compete with (publicly-subsidized)
courts in the market for resolving disputes. 5 Accordingly, ADR providers
emphasized their competitive advantage over formal adjudication. ADR
providers emphasized-or exaggerated, as the case may be-the costs, time
delays, and other pathologies associated with trials.52 In mediation, for
example, the more that a trial could be characterized as a monster, the more
that could be achieved by avoiding it.53
juries. Still others viewed ADR as an opportunity to offload a public expense.
48 This argument also splinters, with some emphasizing access and others justice. If
ADR is cheaper and less formal than adjudication, poor or marginalized groups may be
more likely to pursue relief. For others, the processes of ADR could better ensure privacy
or protect trade secrets. See Miranker, supra note 43.
49 See generally Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Judicial Referral to ADR: Issues and
Problems Faced by Judges, FJC DIRECTIONS 8, 11 (Dec. 1994).
so See generally Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS
IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 78 (H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills eds., 1946).
5 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979); Brunet, supra note 45, at 47; Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives
of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE 107 (1983).
52 The proclaimed demerits of trials include: binary outcomes; unpredictable results;
publicity and lack of privacy; generalist (non-expert) judges; ignorant, emotional, and/or
biased juries; and formalities that can intimidate, marginalize, and chill. See generally
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The "New Litigation, " 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2010)
(recounting "[c]onventional wisdom" about litigation).
S3 An essential component of the mediation process is ensuring that each of the
disputing parties appreciates their best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). A
mediation resolution is more attractive when the alternatives are ugly. The BATNA is not
some platonic ideal of success in court, but rather an outcome that takes into account the
monetary and nonmonetary costs of formal adjudication. See KOVACH, supra note 10, at
31-34; MOORE, supra note 33, at 19-24; Folberg, supra note 33 at 3.
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Complete histories of the ADR movement are available elsewhere.54
In this Part, I intend to establish only a timing issue, which should be relatively
non-controversial. For purposes of my argument, the modem ADR movement
need not have started precisely in the year 1976. The Pound Conference
appears to be the inflection point, though even that may be a product of
groupthink.55 There can be little doubt, however, that sometime in the late-
1970s the modem notion of alternative dispute resolution as a constellation of
processes emerged and flourished.
Finally, throughout this paper I refer frequently to "ADR" and to
"mediation." Mediation is a form of ADR-arguably the paradigmatic form.s6
But the terms are not substitutes. Yet there is no need here to chronicle separate
histories for mediation, arbitration, or other distinct alternative processes.
Sander discussed both mediation and arbitration.57 The following Ngram
suggests that, compared to arbitration, mediation received the more significant
bump in notoriety after 1976. As the modem ADR movement accelerated,
arbitration, mediation, and other processes were in the slipstream.
54 See generally JEROME T. BARRETT AND JOSEPH P. BARRETT, A HISTORY OF
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE STORY OF A POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENT (2004); STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, ARBITRATION, & OTHER PROCESSES 2-3 (6th ed. 2012); Valerie A. Sanchez,
Towards a History of ADR: The Dispute Processing Continuum in Anglo-Saxon England
and Today, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1996); Main, supra note 43, at 332 n.7
(collecting authorities).
55 The Pound Conference may be simply the mascot. For example, contemporaneous
with the Pound Conference, the National Center for State Courts had undertaken its own
study of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. See generally EARL JOHNSON JR.,
VALERIE KANTOR & ELIZABETH SCHWARTZ, OUTSIDE THE COURTS: A SURVEY OF
DIVERSION ALTERNATIVES IN CIVIL CASES (Nat'l Center for State Courts ed., Jan. 1977).
The coincidental publication of several books and articles was surely also instrumental.
See, e.g., THE DISPUTING PROCESS: LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES (Laura Nader & Harry F. Todd,
Jr. eds., 1978); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281 (1976); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 353 (1978). See also supra note 41. See also Mathews v. Eldredge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976).
See generally Fuller, supra note 41, at 314-15 (discussing the non-authoritarian
emphasis of mediation).
5 See SANDER, supra note 31, at 65, passim.
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III. THE THIRD ERA OF PROCEDURE
The modem ADR movement emerged in 1976, when formal
adjudication was still in its third era. This timing is important because my
thesis is that is that the modem ADR movement eventually pushed formal
adjudication into its fourth era.
In our contribution to a symposium that celebrated the seventy-fifth
anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Professor Stephen Subrin
and I observed that "[tihe history of American civil procedure divides rather
naturally into three eras."5 The first era commenced with the founding of the
United States and the transplantation of English substance and procedure." In
1848, the State of New York launched the second era by enacting what has
since been called the Field Code.6o Around the turn of the twentieth century,
reformers demanded a new procedure that would apply uniformly across all,
federal district courts. 6 1 A well-chronicled decades-long effort ultimately led
to the passage of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934.62 The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure became law four years later, launching the third era.
Although the corpus of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
launched the third era has remained more or less intact since 1938, there is
broad consensus that we are now in a fourth era.63 The fourth era was wrought
ss Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1842.
59 1d601d
61id. at 1843.
62 Id. (citing Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015, 1050-109 (1982)); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L REV. 909, 948-
956 (1987).
6 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 8; Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited:
The Stages of Equitable Discretion, 15 NEV. L.J. 1397 (2015); Judith Resnik, Procedure
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by a combination of congressional legislation, amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and especially case law. Two of the key reforms-
reinterpretations of the pleading and summary judgment standards-were
entirely a product of case law.M Periodization is difficult because both of those
key reforms occurred in the lower courts before Supreme Court decisions
ratified the emergent practices. Accordingly, a la Sorites Paradox, it is
difficult to identify the moment of transition from the third to the fourth era.
At this point it is necessary to observe only that none of the key laws,
amendments, or court decisions that constitute the fourth era predate 1976.
Accordingly, when the distinguished judges, lawyers, and academics retumed
from the Pound Conference and went back to work, the practice and procedure
of the third era prevailed in the courts. What exactly did that mean?
The three hallmarks of procedure in the third era were (1) notice
pleading, (2) broad discovery, and (3) trials. First,
"notice pleading" . . . required only that a
pleading give the defendant notice of the
plaintiffs grievance. Notice pleading
reflected a deliberate break from prior
pleading regimes, whose cumbersome
requirements were seen as traps for the
unwary. Rather than having courts decide
cases based on the niceties of pleading, the
liberal ethos of the FRCP required only the
barest of allegations, so that cases could be
decided on the merits, by jury trial, after full
as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2005); Spencer, supra note 8. See also Paul D.
Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE
L.J. 597 (2010); Harold Konglu Koh, "The Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination
ofEvery Action "?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1525 (2014); Margaret B. Kwoka, Judicial Rejection
of Transsubstantivity: The FO1A Example, 15 NEV. L.J. 1493 (2015); Alexandra D. Lahav,
Procedural Design, 71 VAND. L. REV. 821 (2018); James Maxeiner, The United States
Federal Rules at 75: Dispute Resolution, Private Enforcement or Decisions According to
Law?, 30 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 983 (2014); Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal
Civil Procedure After the 2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1 (2016); Margaret Y.K. Woo,
Manning the Courthouse Gates: Pleadings, Jurisdiction, and the Nation-State, 15 NEV.
L.J. 1261 (2015); Sternlight, supra note 33; Yamamoto, supra note 4; Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Forgetfulness, Fuzziness, Functionality, Fairness, and Freedom in Dispute Resolution:
Serving Dispute Resolution Through Adjudication, 3 NEV. L.J. 305 (2003).
6 See infra notes 146-52 and accompanying text [Part V.B].
6 See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text [Part V.B].
6 Put another way, the fourth era had no Pound Conference. Unless it was the Pound
Conference. See infra notes 127-55 and accompanying text [Part V].
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disclosure through discovery.6 7
Second, "[d]iscovery is a means for the parties, prior to trial, to learn the
substance of each other's cases. The theory is that once both sides know
the full truth, they can either settle the case themselves, or can at least
agree on which issues are material to decision." 6 8 Third is trial:
The drafters wanted to give people access to
a meaningful day in court and believed that
the procedural process should effectuate
those aspirations. The system the rule-
makers created was designed with that in
mind, and many believed that the Federal
Rules represented a Gold Standard that
envisioned a trial and, when appropriate, one
before a jury.6 9
Judges tried cases in the third era; this task is surely the "highest and
best use of [their] time."7 0 Trials represent the gold standard for the meaningful
integration of law and fact. 7 1 And, of course, the positive externalities of trials
include the development of the law, the declaration of social values, and in
72jury cases, civic participation.
In 1950, the percentage of civil cases terminated during or after trial
in the U.S. District Courts was approximately eleven percent.73 In 1976, the
67 William H.J. Hubbard, A Fresh Look at Plausibility Pleading, 83 U. CI. L. REV.
693, 695 (2016).
68 James R. Maxeiner, Pleading and Access to Civil Procedure: Historical and
Comparative Reflections on Iqbal, a Day in Court and a Decision According to Law, 114
PENN ST. L. REV. 1257, 1278 (2010).
69 Arthur R. Miller, What Are Courts For? Have We Forsaken the Procedural Gold
Standard, 78 LA. L. REv. 739, 740 (2018).
70 Thomas 0. Main, Procedural Constants: How Delay Aversion Shapes Reform, 15
NEV. L.J. 1597, 1628 (2015); Young, supra note 5, at 89.
7 See Miller, supra note 69. See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, Revisiting the
Integration of Law and Fact in Contemporary Federal Civil Litigation, 15 NEV. L.J. 1387
(2015); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas 0. Main, The Integration of Law and Fact in an
Uncharted Parallel Procedural Universe, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1981 (2004).
72 See Robert M. Ackerman, Vanishing Trial, Vanishing Community? The Potential
Effect of the Vanishing Trial on America's Social Capital, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 165 (2006);
Burbank & Subrin, supra note 5.
73 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-4 (1950). See also
Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
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percentage was approximately nine percent.7 4 The commitment to jury trials
is evident in the printed materials from the seminars for newly-appointed
judges. In his session on case management at the 1961 seminar, U.S. District
Judge George L. Hart, Jr.75 taught judges how to juggle the demands of
simultaneous jury trials. 7 6 "It is common for a judge to have one jury out
deliberating in a case, while he is trying the next case and, on occasion, ajudge
will have two juries deliberating on their verdict while he is trying a third
case."7 7
In the third era, nearly all civil cases resulted in one of two outcomes:
settlement or trial. If a case was not tried, it was because the parties settled.
Because approximately ten percent of cases were tried, nearly all cases were
resolved by settlement.7 8 Cases were rarely dismissed for failure to state a
claim for which relief could be granted. While the precise rate of dismissals in
those early decades under the Federal Rules remains something of a mystery,
we can fairly surmise that the number was likely very small. 7 9 "Even as late as
the 1980s, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules reviewed and discussed a
draft proposal to abrogate the Rule 12(b)(6) motion because it was never used
and, therefore, served no purpose."8 0 Arthur Miller joked that the motion "was
last effectively used during the McKinley administration."8 1
REv. 4, 44 tbl. 2 (1983).
74 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-1 (1976). See also
Galanter, supra note 73.
Judge Hart was appointed to the federal bench in 1958, served as chiefjudge from
1974-75, and took senior status in 1979. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/hart-george-luzeme-jr.
Proceedings of the Seminar on Procedures for Effective Judicial Administration, 29
F.R.D. 191, 266-70 (1961).
n Id at 268. The Program for the 1975 Seminar for Newly Appointed United States
District Judges allocates two and one-half days to civil matters generally. One-half of one
of those days (or twenty percent of the total) is devoted to a discussion of "The Civil
Nonjury Trial" and "The Trial of the Civil Jury Case." See PROGRAM, SEMINARS FOR
NEWLY APPOINTED UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES (1975).
7 This value of ten percent refers to an approximate average of the eleven percent in
1950, supra note 73 and accompanying text, and the nine percent in 1976, supra note 74
and accompanying text.
7 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 4546 (1957) (holding that unless a plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim, a complaint should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (finding "no
pleading requirement of stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action" under the
new rules of civil procedure).
so Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1844 n.26 (citing THOMAS E. WILLGING, USE OF
RULE 12(B)(6) IN Two FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 1 (1989)).
Id at 1845 n.27 (citing ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO
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Summary judgments technically were available under the Federal
Rules. But in the third era, a summary judgment was "an extraordinary
remedy, one that should only be granted when there was not the 'slightest
doubt' as to the actual facts."82 Some of the drafters of the original Federal
Rules anticipated that summary judgment would be most useful to plaintiffs
as "a simple and quick way of disposing of... debts or liquidated demands."
8 3
Again, the activity of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules provides
interesting perspective about how the motion was (not) used: Around 1980,
reformers tried to amend Rule 56 because judges were not using the summary
judgment rule to its full effect.84
Further, as motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment
posed no formal obstacle to trials, there were also few practical obstacles.
Cases were resolved swiftly. In 1966, the median time interval from filing to
disposition for a civil action was just nine months;85 in 1976 it was still nine
86
months. Even among the subset of cases that went to trial, the median time
interval from filing to disposition was just seventeen months in 1966; 87 in 1976
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT
AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 8 (1984)).
82 Stempel, supra note 3, at 155 (citing Tomalewski v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 494
F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1974); Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Hamm Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 388 (8th
Cir. 1968)).
83 Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil
Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 602
(2004) (citing Memoranda with Reference to Certain Problems Under Preliminary Draft
111 (1/14/37), microformed on Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference, Committees on
Rules of Practice and Procedures, 1935-88, No. CI-5320-17, at 3). See also Stephen N.
Subrin, supra note 62, 980 (stating that "the Rules gave so many tools to the [plaintiff]
'that it would be cheaper and more to the self-interest of the defendant to settle for less
than the cost to resist"' (quoting Finch, Some Fundamental and Practical Objections to the
Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States,
22 A.B.A.J. 809, 810 (1936))).
84 Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1845 n.28 (citing Martin B. Louis, Summary
Judgment and the Actual Malice Controversy in Constitutional Defamation Cases, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 707, 722 (1984) (noting that the summary judgment doctrine "has
increasingly been ignored or paid mere lip service" by courts); JOE S. CECIL & C.R.
DOUGLAS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE IN THREE DISTRICT COURTS 1 (1987). The
Supreme Court's trilogy of summary judgment cases in 1986 re-interpreted the mandate
of the rule, thereby obviating the need for any textual reform. See generally infra note 150.
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-5 (1966).
86 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-5 (1976).
8 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-5 (1966).
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it was sixteen months. Thus, a party who wanted a trial could actually see
the opportunity for one on the horizon.
Nor was the cost of taking a case to trial prohibitive. A 1951 study of
the use of discovery in five U.S. district courts revealed that formal discovery
occurred in only 25.5 percent of all civil cases. Document requests were used
89in only four percent of all cases, and depositions in only fourteen percent.
There is very little mention of discovery abuse or even of discovery generally
in the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts' Annual Reports in the 1950s,
1960s, and even well into the 1970s.90 Prior to 1980, amendments to the
discovery rules were still expanding the scope and amount of discovery.
Accordingly, it is fair to conclude that, with the exception of the five to fifteen
percent of cases that were so-called "mega cases,"9 2 discovery in the third era
was neither a serious problem nor perceived to be a serious problem.93 Instead,
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-5 (1976).
Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1846 n.35 (citing ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 105 (1951)). Interestingly, this data was reported as showing that
"the discovery rules are popular." Id at 104. Of course, non-formal "discovery" was also
happening informally through exchanges of information outside the framework of the
Federal Rules. See id. at 104-05.
90 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-1 (1950-1979).
Hon. Paul V. Niemeyer, Revisiting the 1938 Rules Experiment, 71 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 2157, 2165 (2014) ("discovery was expanded in scope and facility through
amendments made in 1946, 1963, 1966, and 1970.") See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery
"Reform, " 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 207-09 (2001).
92 Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1846 n.34 (citing David M. Trubek et al., The Costs
ofOrdinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 80-81 n.17 (1983) (using the term to describe
cases "excluded as 'too big' to be handled within the scope of the research")); Judith A.
McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C.L. REV.
785, 791 (1998) ("Cases involving extensive discovery are in fact relatively rare-the
studies using actual file reviews uncovered very few cases involving more than ten
discovery requests, perhaps 5-15% depending on the sampling method.").
See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the "Haves" a Little More: Considering the
1998 Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229, 246-49 (1999) (rebutting the public perception of
discovery concerns by reference to studies conducted in 1960 by The Columbia Project for
Effective Justice and in 1978 by the Federal Judicial Center). To be sure, broad discovery
has always had its critics. Even at the Pound Conference it was "alleged that abuse is
widespread, serving to escalate the cost of litigation, to delay adjudication unduly and to
coerce unfair settlements." Report of the Follow-Up Task Force, in THE POUND
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 318 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R.
Wheeler eds. 1979). The empirical data has never supported such anecdotal accounts. See
Thornburg, supra note 93, at 246.
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the amount and costs of discovery were non-existent, modest, or
commensurate with the stakes of the litigation.
Nor was there undue pressure from judges to settle. Judges decided
motions, of course. And judges held a pretrial conference-usually ten days
before the scheduled trial date. 94 But most cases settled. In fact, approximately
fifty percent of the civil cases settled without any court action.9 5 The
contemporary notion of judicial case management had not been invented.
When parties settled, it was because both parties agreed that the settlement
was preferable to a trial.
One might fairly describe this as a passive-aggressive model of
adjudication. Ten percent or so of the civil cases were tried, and in that set of
cases, the parties' rights and responsibilities were formally (aggressively)
declared therein. The looming prospect of a trial in all cases enabled parties to
negotiate settlement agreements in lieu of formal adjudication. Settlements
were reached in the vast majority of cases without direct judicial intervention.
But in each such case the threat of a trial played an essential even if indirect
(passive) role in generating the settlement.
94 See Peter T. Fay, Settlement Approaches, in SEMINARS FOR NEWLY APPOINTED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES, 67, 71-72 (1973); Warren K. Urbom, Calendar
Control-Organizing the Flow of Cases, in SEMINARS FOR NEWLY APPOINTED UNITED
STATES DISTRICT JUDGES 7, 9 (1973).
9s See Main, supra note 70, at 1625.
96 In summary,
Rule 16 was significantly overhauled in 1983
(and has been amended again many times since).
Since 1983, the Federal Rule requires scheduling
and planning conferences at much earlier stages in
the litigation process. Specifically, a scheduling
order must issue within 120 days of service of the
complaint. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(2). That scheduling
order, in turn, must "set dates for pretrial
conferences and for trial." FED. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(3)(v). Note the plural use of the term pretrial
conferences. These pretrial conferences now regard
subjects much more preliminary than the trial,
including "eliminating frivolous claims,"
"amending the pleadings," and "scheduling
discovery." FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(A)-(B), (F).
Id at 1622 n.129.
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IV. THE JUDICIAL HIERARCHY EMBRACES ADR
The ADR movement generally, and mediation in particular, suggested
that a professional's insight and guidance could lead parties to resolve their
disputes without trials. The notion that disputes could be resolved by
mediators without trials coincided neatly with Chief Justice Burger's call for
"new machinery for resolving disputes." 9 7 He long had reasoned that, if
hospitals and corporations could take advantage of business management
techniques, so could judges;9 mediation was an even better role model.
The judiciary prescribed "improved case management efficiency,"
and the goal was settlement.99 The message to district courts favoring case
management and trial avoidance around 1978 was particularly strong.ioo At a
program for newly-appointed judges, Judge Hubert Will of Chicago told his
colleagues not to think of themselves as "skilled referees who ... step into the
ring when the lawyer combatants said they were ready to fight," for that will
not "produce the highest quality of justice in the shortest possible time at the
lowest cost."10 ' As Judge James Lawrence King put it, "[t]he philosophy of
caseflow management presented here is one of active judicial control."l0 2
Judge William Schwarzer "urge[d] that judges intervene in civil litigation and
take an appropriately active part in its management from the beginning."'0 3
"[fJustice is not better served," Judge Schwarzer emphasized, "by the passive
judge who by inaction permits litigation to blunder along its costly way toward
exhaustion of the litigants, when it might have long been settled or at least
controlled to everyone's benefit. 10 4 This non-formal messaging was ultimately
BURGER, supra note 30, at 25.
98 Hon Warren E. Burger, The Courts on Trial, Speech at the American Bar
Association (Feb. 21, 1956), in WARREN E. BURGER, DELIVERY OF JUSTICE 4, 6 (1990).
99 Dorothy J. Della Noce, Mediation Theory and Policy: The Legacy of the Pound
Conference, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 545, 546 (2002). See also Kimberlee K.
Kovach, Privatization of Dispute Resolution: In the Spirit of Pound, but Mission
Incomplete: Lessons Learned and a Possible Blueprint for the Future, 48 S. TEX. L. REV.
1003, 1016-18 (2007); FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) advisory committee's note to 1983
amendment (stating that "settlement should be facilitated at as early a state of the litigation
as possible."); see also D. MARIE PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL
DISTRICT JUDGES 8-9 (1986).
0 Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69
Judicature 257 (1986) (discussing judicial ethos in the 1970s and 1980s).
1o1 Id. at 261 (citing Hubert L. Will, Judicial Responsibility for the Disposition of
Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 89, 121, 124-25 (1976)).
102 James Lawrence King, Management of Civil Case Flow From Filing to
Disposition, 75 F.R.D. 89, 166 (1976).
103 William W. Schwarzer, Managing Civil Litigation: The Trial Judge's Role, 61
JUDICATURE 400, 402, 404 (1978).
104 Id See also Alvin B. Rubin, The Managed Calendar: Some Pragmatic Suggestions
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concretized in waves of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
beginning in 1983, that required judges to get involved earlier and more
aggressively in each case.105 Rule 16 was amended to make "case management
an express goal of pretrial procedure." Through judicial education programs
and policies, the clear message to trial courts was that trials were a "mistake"
106
and a "'failure' of the judicial system to properly perform its mission of
resolving disputes." 0 7
Trial judges heeded the message. As Figure 1 shows, in 1985, the total
number of civil cases disposed at trial in federal courts peaked. Then,
beginning in 1986, the absolute number of trials began a precipitous decline-
dropping ultimately to current levels, where there are now considerably fewer
civil trials each year than there were in the 1940s.
AboutAchieving the Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination ofCivil Cases in Federal
Courts, 4 JUST. SYs. J. 136, 136 (1978) ("The judicial role is not a passive one.").
105 The rule codified a practice that was already underway. Professor Judith Resnik
saw this and famously warned of its consequences in 1982. See Resnik, supra note 6.
106 Samuel R. Gross & Kent R. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1996) ("Trial is a disease, not generally fatal,
but serious enough to be avoided at any reasonable cost." (citation omitted)); Russell
Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An
Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REv. 107, 107-08 (1994) (suggesting that most
judges believe "trials represent mistakes-breakdowns in the bargaining process-that
leave the litigants and society worse off than they would have been had settlement been
reached." (footnote omitted)). Cf Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 211, 261 n.200
(1995) (criticizing the inclination to perceive of "trial as a pathological event").
107 Anderson, supra note 5, at 105 (attributing the language quoted in the text to the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).
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FIGURE 108
Total Number of Civil Cases Disposed at Trial
12,000----- -
2,00
Source: Admin. Office of the U.S Courts, Annual Reports of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts tbl. C-1 (1947-2017)
To be clear, it is not conventional wisdom that courts abandoned their
commitment to trials in the mid 1980s. Rather the common narrative is that
trials have been vanishing since at least the 1960s. Indeed, as Figure 2 shows,
the percentage of civil case disposed at trial shows such a decline.
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1os Figure 1 reflects some dramatic spikes for outlier events in 2007 and 2009. The
events involved the resolution of consolidated cases in the Middle District of Louisiana
arising out of the explosion of an oil refinery. For an explanation of these spikes, see Main,
supra note 70, at 1617 n.109.
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FIGURE 2109
Percentage of Civil Cases Disposed at Trial
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80% _
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Source: Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Reports of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts tbl. C-1 (1947-2017)
The denominator in the percentage calculations in Figure 2 is the total
number of terminated cases. Beginning in the 1960s, Congress significantly
expanded the scope of federal jurisdiction and created many new causes of
action."1 0 As a result, caseloads grew at unprecedented rates."' In the 1970s
the average annual rate of growth was 7.4 percent.1 12 From 1980 to 1985, the
average annual rate of growth was 10.1 percent. 113 In the long decade between
1969 and 1983, the civil caseload of the federal courts more than tripled." 4
Importantly, however, even during that long decade, the numerator (i.e., the
total number of trials) also climbed, as demonstrated in Figure 1.
'09 Figure 2 reflects some dramatic spikes for outlier events in 2007 and 2009. The
events involved the resolution of consolidated cases in the Middle District of Louisiana
arisin out of the explosion of an oil refinery. For an explanation of these spikes, see id
I See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the
Meaning ofArticle III, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924, 956 at n. 110 (2000) (citing Administrative
Office of the US. Courts, Revision of List of Statutes Enlarging Federal Court Workload
(Sept. 18, 1998) (memorandum) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library)).H] In the three decades leading up to 1969, the civil caseloads of federal courts grew
at a modest average annual rate of approximately 3.4 percent. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-I (1942-1969).
112 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-1 (1969-1983).
113 See Id
114 See Id.
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As the civil caseloads grew, the total number of federal judges
expanded too, albeit at a slower rate.' 1 5 Figure 3, below, demonstrates that in
1947 the typical federal judge tried, on average, 1.7 civil cases per month.
Nearly forty years later, in 1985, the typical federal judge still tried, on
average, 1.7 civil cases per month. Accordingly, even during the long decade
from 1969 to 1983, when the average judge's civil caseload doubled, 116 judges
still tried, on average, about 1.7 cases per month. Again, the mid-1980s is
pivotal.' 17
FIGURE 3"
Average Number of Civil Trials Per Judge Per Month
2.5
1.5
1.0
0.0
Source: Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Reports of the Director of the
Administrative Office ofthe United States Courts thl. C-1 (1947-2017)
11 For example, during the long decade when the number of civil cases tripled, the
number of federal district judges increased by about seventy percent. See id116 See id
"1 Today the average federal judge has one civil trial every three or four months.
But even that may overstate the actual number since a trial is defined as "a contested
proceeding where evidence is introduced." See Civil Statistical Reporting Guide, Tech.
Training & Support Div. & Statistics Div. of the Admin. Office of the United States
Courts i, 3:18 (July 1999), available at
http://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/margoschlanger/Documents/Publications/Using
CourtRecordsAppendix/CivilStatistical Reporting Guide.pdf. A contested motion
for a preliminary injunction (where evidence or taken) or an evidentiary hearing on a
motion to dismiss for personal jurisdiction thus could be coded as a trial.
"1 Figure 3 reflects some dramatic spikes for outlier events in 2007 and 2009. The
events involved the resolution of consolidated cases in the Middle District of Louisiana
arising out of the explosion of an oil refinery. For an explanation of these spikes, see Main,
supra note 70, at 1617 n.109.
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The absolute number of trials may be more important than the
percentage of cases that are terminated by trials. Trials ground our normative
standards, allow the law to develop, publicize something, and preserve a role
for juries.' 19 For decades these positive externalities were achieved with each
judge trying approximately 1.7 cases per month. Importantly, that absolute
number of trials also casts a sufficient shadow for all other cases to settle. If
instead judges tried the same percentage of cases through the litigation
explosion in the 1970s, judges would have tried three or four cases per month
rather than just one or two. The marginal gains of those additional trials might
be difficult to find except for the parties in the one or two cases each month
that were deprived of the gold standard for the integration of law and fact.
12 0
It is the absolute number of trials that sets the tone.
Figures 1 and 3 demonstrate that judges abandoned their commitment
to jury trials in the mid-1980s. Attributing this development to the increased
attention given judicial case management (and the professed allergy to trials)
is not only a plausible explanation, but an obvious one.121 Alternative
explanations often mention the pressure that the criminal docket has put on the
civil docket, but the size of criminal dockets did not change dramatically
during this period.1 22 To be sure, The Speedy Trial Act required judges to give
priority to criminal cases, but that legislation was passed in 1974 (not in, say,
1985).123
Another explanation-indeed, the most frequently-cited cause-for
the vanishing trial is the so-called "litigation explosion." But as established
above, judges continued to try the same number of cases even during the
period of explosive growth. Moreover, judges abandoned trials in the mid-
1980s as their caseloads lightened. In five of the six years from 1986 to 1991,
there was a year-over-year decline in the number of newly-filed civil cases.124
In fact, in the more than three decades since 1985, the average annual rate of
growth in the civil caseload of the federal courts is less than one-half of one
119 See Ackerman, supra note 72.
120 See supra notes 69 and 71.
121 In 1980, Federal Rule 26 was amended to require an early discovery conference in
all but a handful of excluded cases. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(f) advisory committee's notes to the
1980 amendments. In 1983, Rule 16 was amended to explicitly include settlement and
ADR as topics for discussion at pretrial conferences. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) advisory
committee's notes to the 1983 amendments. Of course, these are just the formal reform
efforts. See also supra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
122 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-1 (1960-2017).
123 Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(f).
124 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-1 (1986-1991).
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percent.125 Further still, the size of judicial budgets and the staff of the
judiciary (magistrate judges, bankruptcy judges, judges with senior status, law
clerks, and interns) have expanded dramatically since 1985; yet none of this
institutional investment is reflected in the number of trials.1 2 6
V. THE EMERGENCE OF THE FOURTH ERA
With the embrace of the modern ADR movement, judges were either
inclined or directed to get out of the business of trying cases-even though
presiding over trials was the family business. Throughout the third era, judges
tried cases and managed cases in anticipation of trial, but did little else to
dispose of cases.1 27 And this passive-aggressive approach worked: by trying
approximately ten percent of the cases, the others settled.1 28 But if these third
era judges were not going to try cases, how would they dispose of them?
A. Institutionalization ofADR
With the anti-trial narrative finding traction, judges in the third era
needed to dispose of cases without trying them. In three different respects,
judges used ADR "aggressively" to achieve this end.
First, by facilitating the development of private ADR, courts kept
many cases out of formal adjudication altogether. Newfound interest in ADR
had led to the development of an industry that provided mediation, arbitration,
early neutral evaluation, and other dispute resolution services for a fee.129 But
125 The average annual growth rate between 1985 and 2017 is approximately 0.3
percent. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-I (1985-2017).
126 See Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442,
1456 (1983); Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal District
Courts, 2015 U. ILL. L. REv. 1177, 1189-90 (2015); Richard A. Posner, The Federal
Courts: Challenge and Reform 27-28 (1996); Stephen B. Burbank et al., Leaving the
Bench, 1970-2009: The Choices Federal Judges Make, What Influences Those Choices,
and Their Consequences, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 93 (2012) (noting that, in 2009, senior
district judges accounted for 21.2 percent of case terminations and 26.8 percent of all
trials); Philip M. Pro, United States Magistrate Judges: Present but Unaccounted for, 16
NEV. L.J. 783 (2016); Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional
Sources, Alternative Texts, andAlteredAspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2605 (1998); Judith
Resnik, supra note 110, at 949.
127 See supra notes 58-96 and accompanying text.
128 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
129 See DAVID W. EWING, JUSTICE ON THE JOB: RESOLVING GRIEVANCES IN THE
NONUNION WORKPLACE (1989) (discussing case studies of 15 companies); ALAN F.
WESTIN & ALFRED G. FELIU, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES WITHOUT LITIGATION
(1988) (discussing profiles of 12 organizations using ADR); Thomas Donahue & Barbara
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without the enforcement infrastructure provided by courts, participation in
ADR would have been optional, ADR neutrals would have had no meaningful
authority, and the outcomes of ADR proceedings would have been non-
binding and unenforceable. To paraphrase Maitland, ADR without courts
would be a "castle in the air, an impossibility." 30 The unmistakable takeaway
from the Pound Conference was that the ADR movement could commence
construction of its castle on terra firma with government subsidies, with fast-
track regulatory approval, and without preparing an environmental impact
statement.
Second, courts outsourced dispute resolution to ADR providers.
Although the courts originally envisioned ADR as a solution for the "garbage
cases" that were clogging the dockets,13 1 ADR gained legitimacy as "a more
general solution for handling conflicts of any kind." 3 2 This was a dream come
true for Chief Justice Burger who, years earlier, remarked, "One thing an
appellate judge learns very quickly is that a large part of all the litigation in
the courts is an exercise in futility and frustration. Most civil disputes which
are in the courts could be disposed of more satisfactorily in some other
55133
way. New mandates required parties to participate in mediation or non-
binding arbitration, even if the parties resisted.1 34 Agreements to arbitrate that
Reinhardt, Survey: ADR Use Increasing, 15 ALTERN. HIGH COSTS OF LITIG. 66, 75 (1997);
Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the "Vanishing Trial": The Growth and Impact of
"Alternative Dispute Resolution," 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 869 (2004) (citing
ELIZABTH S. ROLPH, ERIK MOLLER & LAURA PETERSEN, ESCAPING THE COURTHOUSE:
PRIVATE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN Los ANGELES 2-3 (1994)).
130 See Thomas 0. Main, Arbitration, What Is it Good For?, 18 NEV. L.J. 457, 460-
61 n.18 (2017) (quoting F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 19 (A.H.
Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., rev. ed. 1936) ("Equity was not a self-sufficient system, at
every point it presupposed the existence of common law. Common law was a self-
sufficient system. ... Equity without common law would have been a castle in the air, an
impossibility.")).
131 Laura Nader, A Reply to Professor King, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 99, 100-
01 (1994) ("Those of us who were privileged to attend the Pound Conference can
remember the press, the television crews, and the fanfare surrounding what anthropologists
in other contexts would call a social drama. It was argued that the 'garbage cases,' as they
called them, should come before alternative forums; the courts should be reserved for more
important case.").
132 Calvin Morrill & Danielle S. Rudes, Conflict Resolution in Organizations, 6 ANN.
REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 627, 635 (2010).
133 Warren E. Burger, Remarks to the American Arbitration Association (Nov. 26,
1968), in WARREN E. BURGER, DELIVERY OF JUSTICE 27 (1990).
134 See Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real
Conversations with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 573 (2004); Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in
Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L.
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were previously void as against public policy were enforced.' 35 Thus, many
cases were sent to ADR, and never returned.
Third, courts also brought ADR into the courthouse-and judges
brought ADR into their chambers. Rather than outsourcing dispute resolution
to an ADR provider, courts offered their own mediation program, for example,
and required parties to use it.' 3 6 The notion of having ADR and formal
adjudication under one literal roof was Professor Sander's vision of the multi-
door courthouse.1 3 7 An especially common type of insourcing was the judicial
settlement conference, where parties were required to participate in settlement
negotiations that were facilitated by a judge.13 8
This institutionalization of ADR was part of the transition from the
third to the fourth era. Courts had to dispose of cases without trials, and ADR
presented several avenues.1 3 9 As ventilated extensively and persuasively
REV. 775, 799-823 (1998); Welsh, supra note 10; Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in
Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787,
789 (2001).
i3 Courts enforce arbitration agreements (1) in routine transactions (2) involving
customers and other vulnerable parties who (3) entered into contracts of adhesion (4) where
the choice of arbitration had nothing to do with resolving uncertainty, (5) the drafter of the
clause chose the arbitrator, and (6) the claims concerned statutory rights. Each of those
enumerated items was once a hurdle to enforcement of an arbitration clause. See Main,
supra note 130, at 466.
See generally Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants'Decision Control in Court-Connected
Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 179
(2002); James J. Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe, Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts:
A Survey of the Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 171 (2001); Thomas Stipanowich,
Living the Dream ofADR: Reflections on Four Decades ofthe Quiet Revolution in Dispute
Resolution, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 513 (2016).
1 See Frank E.A. Sander, The Multi-door Courthouse, NAT'L FORUM, Fall 1983, at
24. See generally Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 84 (A. Leo Levin & Russell
R. Wheeler eds. 1979).
138 See generally Ellen E. Deason, Beyond "Managerial Judges": Appropriate Roles
in Settlement, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 73 (2017); Harold J. Baer, Jr. History Process, and a Role
for Judges in Mediating Their Own Cases, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 131 (2001);
Wayne D. Brazil, Hosting Settlement Conferences: Effectiveness in the Judicial Role, 3
OHIO ST. J. ONDISP. RES. 1 (1987); Resnik, supra note 6; Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case
Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669 (2010); Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can
the Judge Do That?-The Needfor a Clearer Judicial Role in Settlement, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
45 (1994).
Many ADR programs fit into more than one of the three categories described.
Programs are often combinations of insourcing and outsourcing, court-ordered and court-
sponsored, public and private, internal and external, voluntary and involuntary. The
definitional parameters of the many forms of institutionalization are not significant here.
See generally Judith Resnik, Mediating Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process and
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elsewhere, different aspects of the institutionalization of ADR are profoundly
problematic. 14 0 Hence the inclusion of this item on the list of woes that attend
the fourth era of civil procedure.
It is important to observe that what the courts have done with and to
ADR has often been inconsistent with ADR orthodoxy. Requiring mediation,
for example, is inconsistent with mediation's core values that recognize
autonomy and party self-determination. 14 1 Systematizing mediation is
inconsistent with mediation's core value that even the process of mediation is
subject to negotiation.142 Further, when judges host settlement conferences,
there are serious policy problems and ethical concerns.14 3 Pressuring a party to
settle is inappropriate in mediation.1 4 4 And of course few judges are adequately
trained in the art and science of mediation yet feel eminently qualified to
practice it. All this is to say that, often, when the courts "use" mediation or
ADR, it is not the real thing. Put more generously, courts embraced ADR with
the zeal of the converted. In any event, when I blame mediation or ADR, it is
the court's perversion of the practice that is most problematic. The modern
ADR movement merely seeded the idea.
B. Invigorating Pretrial Motions
The institutionalization of ADR did not provide judges with the tools
necessary to dispose of all cases. If the parties did not sign an arbitration
agreement, binding arbitration was not thrust upon them. Even in court-
ordered mediation, the parties were not obligated to reach an agreement. And
Judicial Preferences for Settlement, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 155, 157 (2002).
140 On the problematic nature of court-ordered ADR, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Regulation ofDispute Resolution in the United States ofAmerica: From the Formal to the
Informal to the "Semi-Formal, " in REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS
TO JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 419 (Felix Steffek et al. eds., 2013); Fiss, supra note 6, at
1075; Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 1793 (2014); Resnik, supra
note 63; Resnik, supra note 4; Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts:
Changing the Experiences and Logics of the Public's Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV.
L.J. 1631 (2015); Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U.L. REV. 1101
(2006); Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 13-14 (2006).
On the problematic nature ofjudges managing cases for settlement, see Resnik, supra note
6; Deason, supra note 138; Nancy A. Welsh, Magistrate Judges, Settlement, and
Procedural Justice, 16 NEV. L.J. 983 (2016).
141 See generally Welsh, supra note 10.
142 See generally Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and
Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873 (2002).
143 See generally Welsh, supra note 140; Deason, supra note 138.
144 See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and
Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485 (1985).
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settlement judges could pressure the parties, but either party could resist
settling. How would judges dispose of these cases without trials?
These judges were like mediators in the sense that voluntary
settlements were the objective. But quite unlike a (real) mediation, the parties
in these cases had to settle. These judges could not force parties to settle.145 So
they created leverage points within the litigation process (leverage points not
wholly dissimilar to trials) to restore the passive-aggressive pressures to settle.
First, summary judgment was transformed from an "exceptional
remedy" that was rarely used (in the third era) into the "focal point" of
litigation (in the fourth era).1 4 6 The Supreme Court's trilogy of summary
judgment cases in 1986 is credited (and blamed) for giving the summary
judgment teeth and for revolutionizing the practice of law. 14 7 Of course it was
trial judges, not the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, that were struggling
to dispose of cases while also avoiding trials. It is hardly surprising, then, that,
as Stephen Burbank's empirical work has shown, the Supreme Court's trilogy
of summary judgment cases was merely codifying a standard that had swept
into the lower courts years earlier-perhaps even into the 1970s.' 48 The timing
maps neatly onto my thesis.
Second, there was a new, more rigorous pleading standard. Beginning
in the late 1970s and 1980s (again, note the timing), many lower courts-and
eventually all U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals-adopted a heightened pleading
standard for civil rights plaintiffs. 14 9 In 1993 (and again in 2002) the Supreme
Court unanimously rejected this heightened pleading standard.so Many lower
courts still required a species of heightened pleading by granting defense
motions for more definite statements and by demanding that plaintiffs reply to
145 Some tried. See Welsh, supra note 140, at 1009; see also Deason, supra note 138,
at 87 n.60, 112.
146 Miller, supra note 3, at 1016; Diane P. Wood, Summary Judgment and the Law of
Unintended Consequences, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 231, 240 (2011).
147 See D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary
Judgment on the Supreme Court's New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L.
REv. 35, 38 (1988); Bronsteen, supra note 3; Miller, supra note 3, at 1044.148See Burbank, supra note 83, at 620 (noting the rise of summary judgments prior to
the Su reme Court's trilogy cases in 1986).
See, e.g., Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 665 (1st Cir. 1979) (stating civil rights
complaint must state more than simple conclusions); Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532
F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976) ("[P]laintiffs in civil rights cases are required to plead facts
with specificity."). See generally Thomas 0. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the
Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of Intra-State Unformity in Three States That Have
Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REv. 311, 331-32 (2001).150 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163 (1993); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
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defendants' answers. Eventually, with its decisions in 2007 and 2009, the
Court
retired key language from the seminal notice
pleading case of 1957, instructed judges to
ignore conclusory allegations, expanded the
definition of conclusory allegations, and
replaced notice pleading with a scheme
labeled plausibility pleading. Plausibility
pleading-together with its predecessor,
heightened pleading-is nothing less than a
"revolutionary" departure from notice
pleading from the original vision of the
Federal Rules.1 52
The new standards necessary to survive motions to dismiss and
motions for summary judgment restored the aggressive component of the
passive-aggressive couplet. The passive-aggressive nature of formal
adjudication is further reinforced by statistics demonstrating that motions to
dismiss and motions for summary judgment do not themselves account for
many terminations in court. Although reliable data are notoriously hard to find,
one study suggested that approximately eight percent of civil cases in federal
court are resolved by summary judgment.' 5 3 Approximately two percent of
federal civil cases are dismissed for failure to state a claim.' 54 Of course the
percentage of cases resolved at trial is between one and two percent.' 55 The
151 See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REv. 551, 618-19
(2002) (noting that lower courts found ways to circumvent Supreme Court precedent and
require heightened pleading). The Supreme Court suggested these methods (and others) in
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595-98 (1998). See Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at
1848.
152 See generally Subrin & Main, supra note 1, at 1847-48 (quoting/citing Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679-81 (2009));
Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 Iowa
L. Rev. 821, 823-24 (2010); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape ofFederal Civil
Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination
Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 527 (2010); Dodson, supra note 2, at 54; Spencer, supra
note 2, at 466; Stephen N. Subrin, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Contempt for Rules, Statutes, the
Constitution, and Elemental Fairness, 12 NEV. L.J. 571, 575 (2012)).
153 Burbank, supra note 83, at 591, 606.
154 See Hubbard, supra note 67, at 733 (citing Joe S. Cecil et al., Motions to Dismiss
for Failure to State a Claim After lqbal: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, at *9, *14 (Federal Judicial Center, Mar. 2011)).
155 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-1 (2016-2017).
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combined value of these numbers is beguilingly close to the percentage of
cases resolved by trials in the third era. A number somewhere in the vicinity
of ten percent may be the key to a workable model of passive-aggressive
adjudication.
VI. CONCLUSION
Heightened pleading standards, the new summary judgment standard,
aggressive judicial case management, the obsession with settlement, the
vanishing trial, and the privatization of dispute resolution are all traceable to
the court's abandonment of its commitment to jury trials. Courts abandoned
their commitment to jury trials when Chief Justice Burger adopted the mindset
of mediation that trials should be avoided-and that trials could be avoided
with professional intervention. The mediation movement is to blame for the
fourth era. This is significant from a historical perspective because, to the
extent that that causal argument is correct, the ADR movement was a
bipartisan effort that had broad support.156 The fourth era was simply a
consequence of that movement, even if an unintended one.
There are at least three reasons to question my conclusion and, in
anticipation of future conversation on these topics, I respond to each of them
below.
i) If ideology is not the principal driver of the fourth era reforms,
why do all the fourth era reforms cut against plaintiffs and favor
defendants? First, my thesis focuses on the origins of the heightened pleading
and new summary judgment standards; I blame mediation and ADR for those
reforms. The other problematic fourth era reforms are ADR; obviously, the
ADR movement is to blame for ADR, no matter the courts' perversions of it.
So, let us focus on motions to dismiss and motions for summary
judgment. The premise of the critique is surely correct: by redefining the
pleading and summary judgment standards, the courts made it tougher only
for plaintiffs. But the systemic pressure on trial judges was to find ways other
than the threat ofa trial to sharpen the parties' attention to the point of serious
settlement negotiations. Because the plaintiff carries the ultimate burden of
proving her case at trial, the natural response is to test at earlier stages in the
litigation process the plaintiff's progress with respect to that burden.
Put another way, there was not a plaintiff-friendly version of the
reform to the motion to dismiss that courts rejected in favor of the defendant-
friendly version of the reform that they implemented. The previously-dormant
version of a 12(b)(6) motion could not have been activated and interpreted to
156 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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put pressure on defendants to settle. Indeed, the motion to dismiss only moves
cases in one direction, to-wit: dismissal.
Of course, unlike dismissals, summary judgments can be granted for
both plaintiffs and defendants. Yet here too there is no obvious plaintiff-
friendly version of the reform to summary judgment practice that would have
created pressure on the parties to settle or would otherwise have avoided trials.
In typical litigation, a summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff would be a
partial summary judgment as to certain elements of the plaintiffs case, or
summary judgment on a defendant's affirmative defense. But in neither of
those situations, would an order granting the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment dispose of the case. Rather, it would create momentum for a trial.
One must also appreciate that trial judges implemented these fourth
era reforms from the trenches. These reformers could nudge the applications
of the rules by reinterpreting their mandates, but they could not create new
rules nor amend rules. To be sure, a smarter and more creative person (the
reader, for example!) might see a more plaintiff-friendly re-interpretation of
these pretrial motions. But judges in the trenches more closely resemble me.
And reforming the pretrial motions to avoid trials seems to work in only one
direction, to-wit: placing burdens on plaintiffs just as trials had placed burdens
on plaintiffs.
ii) How can we be sure that, rather than the ADR movement
triggering the other fourth era reforms, there was not some larger
ideological effort that brought us all these reforms (even if those reforms
landed in two waves)? This alternative hypothesis would need to be that the
broad bipartisan support for ADR was a serendipitous development for a
movement that already had ADR (or something like it that could cull the
docket) on its agenda. According to this theory, the fact that progressives also
supported ADR just made the institutionalization of those reforms faster and
easier. This is a plausible theory and, indeed, is essentially the conventional
history.
Materials from the Pound Conference, however, support my historical
account. Chief Justice Burger convened that meeting to "take a hard look" at
all aspects of the justice system. The Follow-Up Task Force's report identified
seven areas of reform, and their first prescribed broader and more effective
deployment of ADR. The Task Force's fourth recommendation addressed
other "Civil Procedure" items, specifically (1) preventing discovery abuse, (2)
preventing attorney misconduct, (3) facilitating fee-shifting, (4) stopping class
action abuse and blackmail settlements, (5) preventing class counsel from
entering into settlements to benefit themselves at the expense of the class, (6)
narrowing the scope of the right to a jury trial, and (7) improving the jury
experience for jurors. This was Chief Justice Burger's agenda and wish list.
569
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Conspicuously absent from the report is any mention of heightened
pleading or new summary judgment standards.157 The omission is especially
significant because such ideas were floated. For example, the first speaker at
the first panel suggested "borrow[ing] from our criminal practice and
requir[ing] a civil litigant to show 'probable merit' before he cranks into action
the prodigious machinery of the judicial process."ss Yet this suggestion
apparently found no traction. Nor was altering summary judgment part of a
larger plot. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger's votes in the trilogy of summary
judgment cases years later suggests unease with the reforms to summary
judgment practice: Chief Justice Burger joined Justice Brennan's dissent in
Celotex, and Chief Justice Burger authored the dissent in Liberty Lobby.15 9
Heightening the pleading standard and modifying the summary
judgment standard were not a central part of the predominant reformers'
agenda.
iii) What about other fourth era reforms that were not discussed
in this paper? With respect to procedure in the fourth era, I have focused on
the most common targets of ire: heightened pleading standards, the new
summary standard, aggressive judicial case management, the obsession with
settlement, the vanishing trial, and the privatization of dispute resolution.
While these reforms are all traceable to ADR, these are not the only fourth era
reforms.
A second-tier list of problems associated with fourth era procedure
would include the following: increasing the likelihood of sanctions,160
inhibiting recovery of statutory attorney fees,i 6 1 tightening the admissibility of
1s7 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 329 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
1ss Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, in THE POUND
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 51,61 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R.
Wheeler eds., 1979).
is9 See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 329; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
In 1983, Rule 11 was amended. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 1983 amendments. See
generally Paul A. Batista, Symposium: Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: How Go the Best Laid Plans, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1985); STEPHEN B.
BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (1989); William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under
the New Federal Rule ]-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985); Carl Tobias, Rule 11
and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485 (1988). Much of the bite of the 1983
amendment was removed by 1993 amendments. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 1993 amendments.
See generally Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision to Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171 (1994);
Edward D. Cavanagh, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Case Against
Turning Back the Clock, 162 F.R.D. 383 (1995).
161 See, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717
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expert evidence,1 62 narrowing the reach of personal jurisdiction,1 6 3
constraining discovery,64 and curbing class actions. 65
(1986); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health and Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001). One might include Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Soc 'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), on this list. In Alyeska, the Court held that it was inappropriate
for the court to award fees without legislative authorization. Although this case also made
it harder for plaintiffs to recover their attorney fees, Congress responded to Alyeska by
enacting new statutes that authorized fee shifting. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976). See generally Catherine R.
Albiston & Laura Beth Neilsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical
Reality of Buckhannonfor the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1087 (2007);
William B. Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney General" Is-and Why It Matters,
57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004); Edward F. Sherman, From "Loser Pays " to Modified Offer
ofJudgment Rules: Reconciling Incentives to Settle With Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1863 (1998).
162 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See also Gen.
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999). See generally Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament: Determining
"Reliable" Under the Gatekeeping Test ofDaubert, Kumho, and ProposedAmended Rule
702 ofthe Federal Rules ofEvidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317, 321 (2000); Allan Kanner
& M. Ryan Casey, Daubert and the Disappearing Jury Trial, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 281
(2007); Jennifer Laser, Inconsistent Gatekeeping and Federal Courts: Application of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. to Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 30 LoY. L.A.L.
REV. 1379 (1997); Leslie A. Lunney, Protecting Juries from Themselves: Restricting the
Admission ofExpert Testimony in Toxic Tort Cases, 48 SMU L. REV. 103 (1994).
163 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571
U.S. 117 (2014); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014); BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 137
S. Ct. 1549 (2018); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct.
1773 (2018). See generally Michael Vitiello, Limiting Access to U.S. Courts: The Supreme
Court's New Personal Jurisdiction Case Law, 21 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 209
(2015); Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, The Business of
Personal Jurisdiction, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 775 (2017); Allan Ides, Foreword: A
Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court's Decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341, 368-77 (2012).
6 Since 1980, the discovery rules have been amended numerous times, including
imposing numerical limits on depositions and interrogatories, and narrowing the scope of
discovery. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26, 1980 amendments, 1983 amendments, 1993
amendments, 2000 amendments, 2006 amendments, 2015 amendments. See generally
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors ofScope,
52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 544 (2001); Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State
Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a
Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1211-12 (2005); Stempel,
supra note 91.
165 See, e.g., Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.
1995); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); Amchem Products,
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Several of these reforms, too, can be explained as efforts to avoid
trials, but nothing more ideological than that. Increasing the likelihood of
sanctions, for example, chills litigation altogether. Having plaintiffs "stop-
and-think" before filing lawsuits means that there will be fewer cases in the
litigation pipeline and, therefore, fewer cases going to trial.' 6 6 To be sure,
defendants could also be more subject to sanctions for frivolous denials or for
pursuing frivolous defenses. But, chilling the assertion of a frivolous denial or
a frivolous defense does not prevent the likelihood of a trial; in fact, it probably
increases the likelihood of trials because it streamlines the plaintiff's case and
thereby moves it closer to a trial.
Next, inhibiting the recovery of statutory attorney fees has similar
effects.167 Naturally, the prospect of recovering a statutory award of attorney
fees as a prevailing party makes litigation more likely. Altering this calculus
to make litigation less likely also makes trials less likely. Further, statutory fee
awards are a particularly interesting case study of whether courts are anti-
plaintiff as opposed to merely anti-trial. Of the hundreds of fee-shifting
statutes, most are written as two-way fee shifts yet are interpreted as one-way
fee shifts, meaning that courts allow only prevailing plaintiffs (but not
prevailing defendants) to recover.' 6 8 One might fairly argue that this
generosity showed plaintiffs is some evidence that courts are trying to
discourage lawsuits, not punish plaintiffs.
Next, tightening the admissibility of expert evidence also follows the
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999);
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
564 U.S. 338 (2011); Epic Systems v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737; Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 2003 amendments. See
generally Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute
Resolution, 107 Nw. U.L. REv. 511 (2013).
See generally Jeffrey A. Pamess, Fines Under New Federal Civil Rule 11: The
New Monetary Sanctions for the "Stop-and-Think-Again" Rule, 1993 BYU L. REv. 879
(1993); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60
FORDHAM L. REv. 475 (1991); Charles M. Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous
Case: An Essay on Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REv. 65 (1996).
167 See generally Jeffrey Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The
Supreme Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REv. 291 (1990); Dan B. Dobbs,
Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem, 1986 DUKE L.J.
435 (1986).
See, e.g., Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978);
Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 191 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1999). See generally John F. Vargo,
The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's Access to Justice,
42 AM. U.L. REv. 1567, 1588 (1993); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Indemnity or Compensation?
The Contract with America, Loser-Pays Attorney Fee Shifting, and a One- Way Alternative,
37 WASHBURN L.J. 317 (1998).
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familiar argument. By tightening the admissibility of evidence on scientific
causation, plaintiffs are less likely to survive summary judgment (and reach a
trial). In fact, this process-a Daubert challenge-is the "summary judgment
substitute."1 6 9 To be sure, a defendant's experts are also subject to Daubert
challenges. But when a defendant's expert is not allowed to testify, trial
becomes more, not less likely.
Next, the narrowing of personal jurisdiction also follows the familiar
argument, because limiting where plaintiffs can sue affects whether they sue.
For example, in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,17 0 a New Jersey
citizen who was injured by a machine while on-the-job in New Jersey filed
suit in New Jersey against the manufacturer of that machine. That suit was
dismissed because the New Jersey courts lacked personal jurisdiction over the
English manufacturer. Based upon the Supreme Court's opinion, this plaintiff
might have been able to get personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the
courts of Ohio or Nevada; otherwise, this plaintiff would need to sue that
defendant in England. Expanding the scope of personal jurisdiction would
increase the likelihood of litigation and trials; naturally, then, narrowing it-has
the opposite effect.
Next, constraining discovery also follows the familiar argument. By
limiting access to evidence that plaintiffs may need in order to meet their
burden of production, plaintiffs are less likely to survive summary judgment
(and reach a trial).17 ' And once again, limiting access to evidence that
defendants may need in order to defend against a claim does not make trials
less likely; if anything, it makes trials more likely. In each of these instances,
then, we see what could be merely an anti-trial bias, albeit with serious anti-
plaintiff effects.
Finally, the curbing of class actions in the fourth era fits the thesis,
albeit less neatly. Two motivations for much of the reform to class action
practice and procedure are (as evidenced in the report of the Pound Conference
Follow-Up Task Force): stopping "litigation blackmail" and preventing self-
169 JoEllen Lind, "Procedural Swift": Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law,
and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REv. 717, 719 (2004) (referring to Daubert as a
"summary judgment substitute"). See also Schneider, supra note 152, at 551-52
(explaining how Daubert has changed the way federal courts deal with summary
judgment).
170 J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
171 See generally Hon. Paul W. Grimm & David S. Yellin, A Pragmatic Approach to
Discovery Reform: How Small Changes Can Make a Big Difference in Civil Discovery, 64
S.C. L. REv. 495 (2013); Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking,
supra note 164, at 542-45; Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The
Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REv. 691, 743
(1998); Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil
Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 BYU L. REV. 579 (1981).
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dealing by class counsel. 17 2 Both of these phenomenon produce settlements
("blackmail settlements" and "sweetheart settlements," respectively) that
critics find objectionable.17 3 To be sure, undoing or preventing settlements is
not an anti-trial measure: if class actions are harder to settle, then trials would
seem more likely. Instead, however, much of the energy of class action reform
has been directed at restricting the certification of class actions: if class actions
are not certified, then the dangers associated with the settlement of class
actions are avoided. The inability to certify a class action also does not
necessarily have anti-trial effects. In fact, making certification difficult would
have the opposite effect if some or many of the class members file independent
actions. As a practical matter, however, in most instances involving class
actions, the value of individual suits makes litigation irrational and thus
improbable.1 7 4 Accordingly, curbing class action practice, like the other
reforms, tends to have anti-trial effects.
172 See American Bar Association, supra note 36.
See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1343 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation,
Amplification, and Distortion, 2003 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 475; Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg,
"Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1377 (2000); Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death": Class
Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1357 (2003).
174 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 370, 430 (2000);
Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 805, 816-17 (1997).
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